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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

THE EFFECT OF CONTROL SOURCE
AND CONTROL FRAMING ON EMPLOYEE EFFORT
Prior research suggests that controls can negatively impact the motivation of employees
to exert effort and that the detrimental effects of controls depend on control source. That
is, controls cause more adverse behavior when employees attribute the source of control
implementation to their manager’s decision than when the source of control
implementation is beyond their manager’s authority. This study uses experiments to
investigate whether the behavioral effects of controls depend not only on control source,
but also on control framing, by which managers can frame the control implementation
either for monitoring or coordinating purposes. The study also suggests that the
interaction of control source and control framing impacts the strength of vertical
collective identity, i.e. the shared identity between managers and employees, which in
turn explains the differences in employee effort. While this study documents that the
interaction of control source and control framing has no effect on vertical collective
identity or employee effort, it finds a surprising result: employees respond more
positively to the monitoring-framed controls than to the coordinating-framed controls,
particularly when the controls are imposed by the manager. This finding suggests that
persuasive messages can backfire if the employees are aware of the manager’s potentially
self-serving motives behind the control implementation.
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1.

INTRODUCTION

Formal control systems are crucial to an organization’s success as controls serve a
vital role in both directing employees’ effort to achieve organizational goals (Bowles &
Polanía-Reyes, 2012; Christ, Emett, Summers, & Wood, 2012; Coletti, Sedatole, &
Towry, 2005) and safeguarding organizational resources (Merchant & Van der Stede,
2007). When implementing formal control systems, organizations relay on various
mechanisms, such as sanctioning, monitoring, and rewarding (Bowles & Polanía-Reyes,
2012; Puranam & Vanneste, 2009; Schweitzer, Ho, & Zhang, 2014). The implementation
of formal controls may be endogenous, i.e. when managers make a choice to put controls
in place, or exogenous, i.e. the source of controls is uncertain or beyond the authority of
the managers (Christ, 2013; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006).1 Endogenous controls have more
unfavorable effects than exogenous controls because employees interpret their managers’
active choice to implement controls as a signal of distrust. This interpretation leads to
employees’ negative responses to the presence of controls (Belot & Schröder, 2016;
Christ, 2013; Christ, Sedatole, & Towry, 2012; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006). However, prior
studies do not examine how managers communicate the purpose of their choice to
implement controls on employees.
My study investigates how the interaction of control source and control framing
employees’ willingness to exert discretionary effort. Managers can frame the control
implementation either for monitoring or coordinating purposes. A monitoring frame
presents controls as a way to limit employees’ self-interested behavior, while a
coordinating frame presents controls as a means to facilitate coordination and resource
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Controls imposed at a firm-wide level, rather than by immediate supervisors, are exogenous.
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allocation between managers and employees (Liu, Wright, & Wu, 2015; Malhotra &
Lumineau, 2011; Schepker, Oh, Martynov, & Poppo, 2014). Since framing provides
social contexts by setting the expectations that people have about each other’s behavior in
a relationship (Dreber, Ellingsen, Johannesson, & Rand, 2013; Ellingsen, Johannesson,
Mollerstrom, & Munkhammar, 2012), I hypothesize that the employees’ perception of the
manager’s choice to put controls in place depends on control framing. My study predicts
that when managers implement controls framed for monitoring purposes, employees
exert less effort compared to situations in which controls are exogenously imposed. I also
predict that the results reverse if controls are framed for coordinating purposes.
I offer a social identity-based explanation for these expected interaction effects. A
monitoring frame increases the salience of the conflict between the interests of managers
and employees, preventing the development of a collective identity between them. When
managers decide to implement the monitoring-framed controls, it reinforces the signal of
managers protecting their self-interests. Hence, it is even harder for employees to
transform their self-categorization from a personal identity to a collective identity
(Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer, 2006; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Wit & Kerr, 2002).
When employees’ personal identity is salient, they focus on maximizing their own
interests by exerting low effort (Kramer & Brewer, 1984). In contrast, a coordinating
frame emphasizes a concern for the shared interest between managers and employees
(Kramer, 2006; Wit & Kerr, 2002). Essentially, a coordinating frame “collectivizes”
group boundaries and promotes common gains (McGinn, Milkman, & Nöth, 2012;
McGinn & Nöth, 2012). Furthermore, employees interpret managers’ choice for
implementing coordinating-framed controls as managers’ noticeable effort to advance the
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sense of collective, rather than merely personal, interests. As a result, managers’ choice
for controls with a coordinating frame sends the contextual cues that build the collective
identity between managers and employees. Accordingly, employees are more willing to
engage in collective behavior by contributing more effort.
Existing studies have extensively investigated the relationship between controls
and horizontal collective identity, the term that I use in this paper to describe the social
ties among team members in an organization (see, e.g. Cardinaels & Yin, 2015; Tayler &
Bloomfield, 2011; Towry, 2003). However, few have investigated the role of controls in
building vertical collective identity, the term in my paper that characterizes the social ties
between leaders and followers.
My study attains null results, which suggest that the interaction of control source
and control framing has no effect on employee effort. Consistent with these null results,
my study also provides no evidence of vertical collective identity taking a mediating role
in this relationship. Supplementary analyses do provide the possible indication of
interaction and mediating effects; even so, these suggestive hints must be interpreted with
caution. However, I find surprising evidence: employees who infer that the manager’s
reason of implementing monitoring-framed controls is for coordinating purposes exert
more effort than employees in the coordinating-framed, endogenous controls, who share
the same belief that the controls are indeed implemented for coordinating purposes. This
surprising finding suggests how persuasive messages concerning the control
implementation can backfire. Being aware that the manager has chosen to implement
controls and that the controls improve the manager’s financial welfare, employees are
skeptical to the persuasive messages conveyed by the coordinating frame, resulting in

3

effort aversion (Ert, Creary, & Bazerman, 2014). Interestingly, employees seem to agree
that it is sometimes necessary for a manager to send stern messages in order to combat
opportunistic behavior. This finding is consistent with Hardin (2004), who argue that
showing distrust is welcomed in circumstances where opportunistic behavior is prevalent.
Therefore, many employees view the monitoring frame of controls imposed by the
manager as a means to facilitate coordination, thereby increasing the employees’
willingness to exert effort.
The null results of my study actually support Dreber et al. (2013), who argue that
social framing effects do not exist in dictator games, which share the same nature of the
social dilemma presented in this study: participants face a tension between maximizing
self-interests or others’ benefit. The study of Dreber et al. (2013) ran an online
experiment with an unusually large sample size (around 200 participants per treatment).
Yet, their study still documents null results, leading them to conclude the absence of
framing effects in dictator games.
However, I speculate another feasible explanation: both the study of Dreber et al.
(2013) and mine recruited Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) workers as the participants
of our experiments. AMT workers tend to exhibit social desirability bias (Antin & Shaw,
2012), making them less sensitive to negative social frames. I suspect that AMT workers
with high reputation, who are perceived as attentive participants, suffer from a higher
level of social desirability bias due to their fear of getting their work rejected by the
experimenter. In general, high social desirability bias drives participants to respond to
questions in a manner that will presumably be viewed favorably by others. In this study,
most participants across conditions claimed that the purpose of control is for
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coordinating, not monitoring, implying that participants are reluctant to acknowledge that
the control, albeit benefiting both managers and employees, is framed with a negative
valence. Another problematic factor associated with AMT workers is that most of them
have a lot of managerial or supervisory experience, making it hard to manipulate their
perceptions of control framing. It is plausible that at their workplaces, those workers are
responsible for framing control mechanisms and thereby can ‘detect’ the real purpose
control. In summary, these null findings may warn future studies about the unintended
drawbacks of recruiting AMT workers.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II develops the theoretical
framework, whereas Section III delineates the hypothesis development. Section IV
presents the research design. Section V presents the analysis and results. Section VI
concludes and discusses opportunities for future research.

5

2.
2.1.

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Social Identity Theory and Vertical Collective Identity in Organizational
Settings
Social identity theory posits that individuals categorize themselves as having

either a personal identity or a social identity. A personal identity defines one as a unique
and distinct self, whereas a social identity categorizes one as in terms of relations to
others (Hogg, 2003). When one’s sense of a personal identity is strong, the person’s
choice is likely to serve self-interests (Kramer, 2006). In contrast, when individuals
situate themselves in a social identity, they are more likely to make decisions in favor of
collective interests (Y. Chen & Li, 2009; Kramer, 2006). A person may have multiple,
co-occurring identities; the activation of a particular identity depends on social cues
(Brewer, 1991; Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer, 2006). A social identity can be made
salient on the basis of perceived similar traits or common fate (Kramer & Brewer, 1984;
Wit & Kerr, 2002).
Prior research refines the distinctions above by describing two levels of social
identities: relational and collective identities. A relational identity views oneself as an
interconnected partner in interpersonal and interdependent relationships (Brewer &
Gardner, 1996; Lord, Brown, & Freiberg, 1999). A relational identity also defines roles
within those relationships; for example, the relationship between child-parent, studentteacher, and subordinate-leader. A collective identity, in contrast, identifies one as a
member of a group. A collective identity is also a basis for differentiating in-group
members from out-group members (Gaertner et al., 2012; Kramer, 2006).

6

Social identity theory is particularly relevant to organizational settings because
organizations often face social dilemmas in which there is a conflict between individual
and collective interests. In addition, social identity can also dramatically shape people’s
economic behavior beyond financial incentives (Akerlof & Kranton, 2000). Since leaders
of organizations strive to mobilize their employees to pursue collective goals, it is crucial
for leaders to instill collective mindsets in their employees. Leaders could achieve this
objective by cultivating the sense of shared social identity between themselves and
employees (Ellemers, De Gilder, & Haslam, 2004; Hogg, 2001; Steffens, Haslam,
Reicher, et al., 2014). In this paper, I term shared social identity between leaders and
employees as vertical collective identity.
Prior studies suggest that vertical collective identity is stronger when employees
believe that leaders share similar attributes with them or when they stand up for
employees’ interests (Hogg, 2001; Steffens, Haslam, Reicher, et al., 2014; Steffens,
Mols, Haslam, & Okimoto, 2016). The strength of vertical collective identity is also
enhanced when leaders express confidence in the capabilities of their team (Fransen et
al., 2015). Importantly, the key mechanism that cultivates a vertical collective identity is
communication strategies that emphasize inclusive language or collective pronouns
(Seyranian, 2014; Steffens & Haslam, 2013). The strength of vertical collective identity
has a significant effect on employees’ perception of leader charisma and their experience
in sharing not only social, but also personal connections with their leaders (Molenberghs,
Prochilo, Steffens, Zacher, & Haslam, 2015; Steffens, Haslam, & Reicher, 2014).
Specifically, strong vertical collective identity increases employees’ trust in and
commitment to their leaders (Giessner, van Knippenberg, van Ginkel, & Sleebos, 2013;
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Steffens et al., 2016). Accordingly, when employees share strong vertical collective
identity with their leaders, the employees are more willing to engage in behaviors that
benefit collective interests, such as contributing more to common resources (Kramer &
Brewer, 1984; Wit & Kerr, 2002) or demonstrating more altruistic actions (Y. Chen & Li,
2009). Collectively, prior work suggests that, when vertical collective identity is strong,
employees exert more effort that increases the welfare of their leaders as well as their ingroup members.
Research in accounting has increasingly explored the relationship between
management control systems and social identities, particularly horizontal collective
identity, i.e. the term I use to describe social ties among group members. Towry (2003)
finds that the effectiveness of control structures depends on the strength of horizontal
collective identity. In addition, formal controls in the form of reward system designs
could also affect the formation of horizontal collective identity (C. X. Chen, Williamson,
& Zhou, 2012). However, few studies have addressed the relationship between controls
and vertical collective identity. Since theories and findings in horizontal relations may
not extend to vertical relations (Luft, 2016), it would be valuable to further investigate
how controls shape and are shaped by vertical collective identity.
Prior literature suggests various factors that determine the development and
reinforcement of vertical collective identity. The first factor is prototypicality, which
means that a leader is viewed as a prototypical (or representative) of a shared identity
within a group (Hogg, 2003; Steffens, Haslam, & Reicher, 2014; Steffens, Haslam,
Reicher, et al., 2014; D. van Knippenberg, 2011). In other words, a leader is seen either
as “being one of us” (Hogg, 2003) or as “an exemplary member in this group” (Steffens,
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Haslam, Reicher, et al., 2014). A high prototypical leader is viewed as the person who
embodies core attributes that other, less prototypical members are expected to conform
(Fransen et al., 2015; Giessner et al., 2013; Steffens, Haslam, Reicher, et al., 2014). The
prototypicality of a leader can be enhanced when the leader is elected by the group rather
than externally appointed (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003).
The second factor that influences the strength of vertical collective identity is the
salience of social boundary (Kramer, 2006; Steffens, Haslam, Reicher, et al., 2014). A
leader should develop structures, practices, rituals, and core values as well as norms that
set the boundary of group membership and create a sense of “us” (Steffens, Haslam,
Reicher, et al., 2014). Another way for leaders to enhance the sense of “us” is by showing
confidence in the group’s success when performing group-oriented behavior (Fransen et
al., 2015). In addition, social attraction is another important factor that promotes vertical
collective identity because socially attractive leaders can make their subordinates readily
comply with their requests and commands (Hogg, 2003). Social attraction might be
derived from charismatic leadership (Shamir, Zakay, Breinin, & Popper, 1998); however,
personal characteristics are not the sole determinant of a leader’s social attraction.
Instead, leaders can become “socialized charismatic” by demonstrating behavior that
promotes group interests (Steffens et al., 2016). In other words, leaders are perceived to
be “in-group champions” by prioritizing the group-oriented goals over personal or outgroup interests (Steffens, Haslam, Reicher, et al., 2014).
Finally, when a leader wishes to redefine or realign vertical collective identity,
the leader should engage in social identity framing (Seyranian, 2014). Seyranian (2014)
argues that social identity framing rests on the power of communication strategies that
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intend to immerse subordinates into three framing phases. The first phase (“social
identity unfreezing”) is to de-link subordinates from the current social identity. The
second phase (“social identity moving”) presents the vision of the new identity, whereas
the third phase (“social identity freezing”) reaffirms the new identity (Seyranian, 2014).
All three phases can be accomplished by using inclusive language that emphasizes the
intergroup bias (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990; Seyranian, 2014).
Specifically, inclusive language draws a distinction between the in-group and the outgroup membership status (Brewer & Gardner, 1996; Perdue et al., 1990), which can be
done by using different collective pronouns, such as “we” versus “they” (Gustafsson
Sendén, Lindholm, & Sikström, 2013; Perdue et al., 1990). During the first phase, i.e.
social identity unfreezing, inclusive language promotes similarity and commonality
between leaders and their subordinates. During the second phase, i.e. social identity
moving, inclusive language negates the previous framing of social identity (Brewer &
Gardner, 1996; Seyranian, 2014). Essentially, using the language that emphasizes the outgroup membership status can evoke a negative impression toward the previous framing of
social identity (Gustafsson Sendén et al., 2013; Lee, Adair, Mannix, & Kim, 2012;
Perdue et al., 1990). Finally, during the third phase, i.e. social identity freezing, leaders
use inclusive language that stresses the positive attributes of the newly framed social
identity (Fransen et al., 2015; Seyranian, 2014). Overall, these studies highlight the
power of communication strategies that leaders can harness to promote vertical collective
identity.
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2.2.

Comparison between Leader-Member Exchange Theory and Social Identity
Theory
Besides social identity theory, another significant theory that focuses on vertical

relations is Leader-Member Exchange (LMX) theory. LMX theory examines the leadersubordinate relationships at interpersonal levels (Lord et al., 1999). Hence, the theory
emphasizes the role of relational self in leader-subordinate relationships (Gaertner et al.,
2012; Lord, Gatti, & Chui, 2016). LMX theory argues that leaders and subordinates can
build their relationships based on mutual trust and respect (high-quality LMX
relationships) or rely on formal employment contracts (low-quality LMX relationships).
High-quality LMX relationships are more likely to increase subordinates’ motivation
(Graen, Novak, & Sommerkamp, 1982). Prior work shows that imposing control on high
LMX relationships will hurt subordinates’ perception of the relationship quality; thereby
leading subordinates to exert less effort. While high-quality LMX relationships are
usually sought after in organizational settings, prior literature also finds that subordinates
who perceive higher-quality relationships with their leader are more willing to undermine
control system by complying to their manager’s request for submitting biased accounting
estimates (Jollineau, Vance, & Webb, 2012). In short, studies that rely on LMX theory
suggest that the quality of LMX relationships affects the effectiveness of control systems
in organizations.
However, the main weakness of LMX theory is that because it focuses on dyadic
relationships; it offers limited predictions at the group or social-network levels (Hogg et
al., 2005). LMX theory argues that leaders can cultivate high-quality dyadic relationships
with different subordinates in isolation from other dyadic relationships (Hogg et al.,

11

2005). In other words, leaders are encouraged to personalize their dyadic relationships
that can cater to each subordinate’ distinct and individual characteristics. Since LMX
theory assumes that subordinates perceive the relationship quality in an absolute sense,
LMX theory does not take into account how subordinates evaluate their relationships
with their leader relative to the relationship quality of other subordinates with the same
leader.
Social identity theory addresses the limitation of LMX theory by shifting the
focus of leadership from interpersonal levels to group and collective levels (Hogg & van
Knippenberg, 2003; Lord et al., 2016). By exploring leader-subordinate relationships
with a broader lens, social identity theory argues that fairness and justice concerns
influence leader-subordinate relationships (Hogg et al., 2005). For example, LMX theory
cannot clearly predict whether showing favoritism will hurt leader-subordinate
relationships. With regard to the relationship between the leader and the favored
subordinate, LMX theory view it as an example of a high-quality LMX relationship.
However, social identity theory argues that playing favorites undermines the
development of the social identity shared between leaders and subordinates. Overall
social identity theory suggests that favoritism results in low-quality relationships.
In addition, social identity theory points out that effective leadership depends on
how leaders strongly identify with their subordinates as a group (Hogg, 2001). Prior
literature (Hogg, 2001; Hogg et al., 2005) compares LMX theory with social identity
theory and finds that personalized leader-subordinate relationships matter when group
membership is weak or not salient. In contrast, high salience groups prefer a
depersonalized leadership style than a personalized one (Hogg et al., 2005). Because
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social identity theory argues that leader group prototypicality is essential to build strong
relationships between leaders and subordinates, the theory predicts that the source of
leader selection (i.e. in-group versus out-group leaders) matters in building strong
relationships between leaders and subordinates (Hogg & van Knippenberg, 2003). LMX
theory, in contrast, is silent concerning the importance of the source of leader selection.
Collectively, leadership research provides evidence that social identity theory
complements LMX theory by broadening the definition of high-quality leadersubordinate relationships.

2.3.

Control Framing
Controls play multiple functions in organizational settings. First, controls can

monitor and mitigate threats of opportunistic behavior from organizational members (Liu
et al., 2015; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Patterson & Smith, 2007). In other words,
controls related to monitoring purposes are designed to safeguard assets and limit
potential self-interested actions that are detrimental to the organization. Alternatively,
controls can serve as a coordination mechanism; they make it easier for organizational
members to understand each other’s role when working together (Gulati, Lawrence, &
Puranam, 2005; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). Hence, controls help members understand
that their actions are interdependent (Dekker, 2004; Gulati et al., 2005; Nicolaou,
Sedatole, & Lankton, 2011). In essence, controls for coordinating purposes could
improve resource allocation and facilitate collaboration (Liu et al., 2015; Malhotra &
Lumineau, 2011; Nicolaou et al., 2011).
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While controls for monitoring purposes could promote compliance (Schweitzer et
al., 2014), monitoring controls also signal distrust of other party’s intention. Hence,
monitoring controls hurt trust development among members (Malhotra & Lumineau,
2011; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002). Accordingly, monitoring controls could erode
cooperative behavior (Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002). In addition,
monitoring controls implemented as penalty contracts increase employees’ effort
(Hannan, Hoffman, & Moser, 2005); however, the effect diminishes in the situations that
call for discretionary effort (Christ, Sedatole, et al., 2012; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006).
Employees also respond strategically to monitoring controls. When they anticipate that
they will not be monitored, they behave opportunistically (Schweitzer et al., 2014). The
favorable impact of monitoring controls is that the controls promote the employees’
perception of fairness (Niehoff & Moorman, 1993). Specifically, employees view
monitoring controls as an unbiased tool in performance appraisal systems (Long,
Bendersky, & Morrill, 2011; Niehoff & Moorman, 1993).
Since controls for coordinating purposes facilitate collaboration, coordinating
controls build trust (Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Nicolaou et al., 2011) and cooperative
behavior (Coletti et al., 2005; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). Coordinating controls also
foster joint learning (Dekker, 2004) and the mutual adaptability for coping with
fluctuations in business pressures or technology (Gulati et al., 2005). Nonetheless, a
heavy-handed implementation of coordinating controls could backfire because it sends
conflicting signals. The reason is that coordinating controls promote collaboration
between managers and employees, while strong controls imply that managers do not trust
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their employees. As a result, the conflicting signals in such controls could provoke
employees to retaliate by increasing dishonest behavior (Liu et al., 2015).
Prior studies suggest that both monitoring and coordinating functions of controls
are necessary to organizational success (Cao & Lumineau, 2015; Dekker, 2004; Gulati et
al., 2005; Nicolaou et al., 2011). Some studies argue that the control mechanisms for
monitoring purposes differ from the mechanisms for coordinating purposes in design
(Lumineau & Malhotra, 2011) or timing (Naranjo‐Gil & Hartmann, 2006). However,
other studies suggest that control framing allows for the same control policies to work as
either monitoring or coordinating controls (Liu et al., 2015; Malhotra, 2012; McGinn &
Nöth, 2012).
Note that prior work does not suggest that organizations should always prefer
controls with a coordinating frame to controls with a monitoring frame. Monitoring and
coordinating functions play complementary roles in ensuring the effectiveness of controls
(see, e.g., Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011; Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange &
Kuhlman, 1994). In addition, controls with a coordinating frame can result in negative
consequences; for instance, when the implementation of coordinating controls is
stringent, the controls invoke an increase in employees’ unethical behavior (Liu et al.,
2015). Similarly, a strong bond between managers and employees may persuade
employees to condone managers’ misreporting (Jollineau et al., 2012).
Framing activities also demonstrate the power of communication (Entman, 1993;
McGinn & Nöth, 2012); framing essentially shapes one’s interpretation of a situation by
“selecting certain aspects of perceived reality and making them more salient in a
communication text” (Entman, 1993, p. 52). Framing can significantly affect behaviors of
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parties involved in interactive economic activities (McGinn et al., 2012). Indeed, in
control settings, managers could frame controls by communicating the purpose of
controls to employees. Therefore, managers’ use of framing plays a critical role in the
effectiveness of control mechanisms because the framing affects employees’ responses to
the presence of controls (Liu et al., 2015; Malhotra, 2012; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011).

2.4.

Control Source
Prior studies argue that in manager-employee relationships, employees display

control aversion because controls restrict their autonomy (Christ, Sedatole, et al., 2012;
Falk & Kosfeld, 2006). In addition, employees perceive their manager’s decision to
implement controls as a signal of distrust (Christ, 2013; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006).
Accordingly, they retaliate by either exerting low effort (Belot & Schröder, 2016; Christ,
2013; Christ, Sedatole, et al., 2012; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002) or conducting
opportunistic behavior (Schweitzer et al., 2014). In contrast, employees exhibit less
dysfunctional behavior when no formal control mechanism is present (Belot & Schröder,
2016; Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002; Schweitzer et al., 2014) or when the controls are
imposed exogenously, i.e. the source of control implementation does not come from the
managers’ authority. In other words, endogenous controls – i.e. controls that come from
the managers’ authority to implement them – would cause detrimental effects. The issues
of endogenous controls have important practical implications because the implementation
of exogenous controls is more costly in real-world settings (Charness & Ellman, 2016).
The negative effects of endogenous controls are heightened when managers
decide to put controls in place by using penalty rather than bonus contracts (Christ,
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Sedatole, et al., 2012). Investigating the settings that demand honest reporting, Cardinaels
and Yin (2015) argue that when managers decide to use truth-telling incentive contracts
instead of fixed-wage contracts, they could signal distrust to their employees.
Furthermore, if managers decide to implement truth-telling incentive contracts after
observing employees’ reporting behavior, an employee could infer that other employees,
in general, report dishonestly. Accordingly, the employee may conform to this selfinterested norm (Cardinaels & Yin, 2015). Collectively, these studies suggest adverse
consequences of endogenous controls.
Interestingly, prior studies also find that the moral legitimacy, or the interpreted
purpose, of endogenous controls determines whether the controls result in adverse
consequences or not. In social settings that involve public goods and thereby punishing
“free-riders” is considered morally legitimate, endogenous controls do not backfire (Fehr
& Rockenbach, 2003). Likewise, endogenous controls do not trigger negative reactions
when distrust is a rational and expected behavior (Hardin, 2004). When opportunism is a
norm and thereby the presence of endogenous controls is perceived necessary to foster
reciprocity, endogenous controls are welcomed (Bicchieri, Xiao, & Muldoon, 2011).
Collectively, these studies indicate that the behavioral impacts of control source depend
on people’s interpretation of the purpose of controls.
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3.
3.1.

HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT

Main Predictions

3.1.1. Interactive Effects of Control Source and Control Framing on Vertical
Collective Identity and Employee Effort
Managers can use control framing to communicate their intent of implementing
controls either for monitoring or coordinating purposes (Liu et al., 2015). At the same
time, the managers’ choice to implement controls also implies their intent (Christ, 2013;
Falk & Kosfeld, 2006). Since the prior literature suggests that the manager’s both stated
and implied intent to implement controls influence the development of vertical collective
identity, I propose that the interaction of control source and control framing can serve a
role for building or destroying vertical collective identity. Specifically, I argue that that
control framing might work as the mechanism of social identity framing in manageremployee relationships.
When controls are framed for monitoring purposes, the controls communicate the
threat of employees’ self-interests to managers’ self-interests (Liu et al., 2015; Lumineau
& Malhotra, 2011). Importantly, controls with a monitoring frame imply that managers
and employees share distinct self-identities, making each other’s personal identity salient
(Kramer, 2006; Wit & Kerr, 2002). Accordingly, controls with a monitoring frame
influence employees to construe themselves in their personal identities rather than in a
shared social identity with their managers, hindering the development of vertical
collective identity.
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Figure 1: Theoretical Framework

I predict that when the implementation of controls with a monitoring frame comes
from the managers’ active choice, it makes the managers’ intent to protect their selfinterests more salient (Christ, 2013; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006). As a result, the endogenous
controls with a monitoring frame exacerbate the perceived division of interests between
managers and employees. In contrast, considering that employees react to exogenous
controls less negatively (Christ, 2013; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006), I predict that the salience
of the conflict lessens when controls with a monitoring frame are imposed exogenously.
When a person’s personal identity is salient, the person is less willing to engage in
behavior that promotes collective interest (Brewer & Kramer, 1986; Kramer & Brewer,
1984). In organizational settings, this phenomenon translates to employees’ willingness
to exert discretionary effort. Therefore, I summarize my predictions as follows:
H1A: When controls are framed for monitoring purposes, employees exert lower
effort in endogenous controls than in exogenous controls.
H1B: When controls are framed for monitoring purposes, endogenous controls
lead to a weaker vertical collective identity than exogenous controls.
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H1C: Vertical collective identity mediates the effect of controls on employees’
effort. Specifically, a strong (weak) vertical collective identity leads to high
(low) effort.
I predict that controls with a coordinating frame generate opposite outcomes.
Essentially, a coordinating frame “collectivizes” group boundaries and promotes common
gains (McGinn et al., 2012; McGinn & Nöth, 2012). When controls are framed for
coordinating purposes, the controls communicate shared interests between managers and
employees (Gulati et al., 2005; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). Prior research also finds
that controls with a coordinating frame are unlikely to hurt trust (Lumineau & Malhotra,
2011; Malhotra & Lumineau, 2011). Hence, controls with a coordinating frame activate
the development of vertical collective identity (Kramer, 2006; Wit & Kerr, 2002).

Figure 2: Illustration of the Predicted Interaction Effect (H1 and H2)
Vertical Collective Identity,
Effort
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In addition, when controls with a coordinating frame are imposed endogenously,
employees perceive it as managers’ active attempt to advance common interests. Prior
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research suggests that collective-oriented messages would be more persuasive to
followers when the messages come from an in-group, rather than out-group, leader
(Molenberghs et al., 2015). In my setting, I predict that the managers’ active choice to
implement controls with a coordinating frame heightens vertical collective identity.
Hence, employees are more willing to exert effort. In contrast, when controls are imposed
exogenously, the controls do not demonstrate managers’ attempt to advance common
interests, weakening vertical collective identity and employee effort. Therefore, I predict
that:
H2A: When controls are framed for coordinating purposes, employees exert
higher effort in endogenous controls than in exogenous controls.
H2B: When controls are framed for coordinating purposes, endogenous controls
lead to a stronger vertical collective identity than exogenous controls.
H2C: Vertical collective identity mediates the effect of controls on employees’
effort. Specifically, a strong (weak) vertical collective identity leads to high
(low) effort.2

3.2.

Additional Predictions

3.2.1. Similarities between Controls without Stated Purposes and Controls with a
Monitoring Frame
When investigating the effects of controls on employee behavior, some prior
studies use parsimonious designs that do not allow managers to communicate the reason
of control implementation (see, e.g. Christ, 2013; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006).3 The findings
of those studies conclude adverse effects of controls. However, I argue that the absence
2

H1C and H2C are identical. The duplication is necessary in order to maintain the logical consistency of
H1 and H2.
3
Such designs are equivalent to real-world settings in which controls are in place but neither the firm nor
managers specify the purpose of control implementation.
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of reasoning for control implementation, rather than a mere presence of controls, might
explain those negative results.
The literature in psychology suggests that when the reason of control
implementation is unstated, individuals view the presence of controls suspiciously,
thinking that the person responsible for the control implementation does not trust them
(Enzle & Anderson, 1993). In addition, the absence of vertical communication in general
hurts the quality of manager-employee relationships because the vertical communication
is crucial for managers to foster attachment and cohesiveness (Postmes, Tanis, & de Wit,
2001). Accordingly, the existence of vertical communication is a necessary condition to
build vertical collective identity (Postmes et al., 2001; Seyranian, 2014; Steffens &
Haslam, 2013).
Since employees suspect their managers’ intention in response to the presence of
controls without managers’ explanation about the control purposes, I argue that
employees would perceive the reason behind the presence of controls is for monitoring
purposes. Building on my earlier predictions above, I further argue that the interaction
between controls without reasoning for implementation and control source would lead to
the similar effects as in the interaction between controls with a monitoring frame and
control source. Specifically, I predict the following:
H3A: When controls are present without stating the reasoning for implementation
(controls without a frame, hereafter), employees are more likely to infer that
the controls are intended for monitoring rather than for coordinating
purposes.
H3B: When controls without a frame are in place, employees exert lower effort in
endogenous controls than in exogenous controls.
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H3C: Vertical collective identity mediates the effect of controls on employees’
effort. Specifically, when controls without a frame are in place, endogenous
controls lead to a weaker vertical collective identity than exogenous
controls.
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4.
4.1.

RESEARCH METHOD AND DESIGN

Main Experiment

4.1.1. Experimental Design
In this study, I run an experiment with a 3 × 3 between-participants design, in
which I manipulate control source (unknown source, endogenous, or exogenous) and
control framing (no frame, monitoring frame, or coordinating frame). The presence of
cells that interact with unknown source or no frame conditions allows me to detect the
incremental effects of my main treatments.

Figure 3: Complete Experimental Design

My experiment structure resembles the design by Falk and Kosfeld (2006), which
is a one-shot principal-agent game. A one-shot game allows studying the effects of
controls in a parsimonious fashion because this design mitigates potential confounds,
such as reputation building or reciprocity, that might occur in a multiple-rounds design
(Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Tayler & Bloomfield, 2011).
I randomly assign participants to one of the nine treatments. Each participant
assumes a role of an employee to an anonymous manager of Division X in Company
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PQR; hence, each condition has one manager that supervises multiple employees.4 In the
beginning of the experiment, each participant receives an endowment of 65 points.5 The
endowment is worth 65 cents. Participants can transfer partial or all points to their
managers; the transfer represents employee effort. Participants are informed that the
welfare of themselves, their division, as well as their manager may improve if they exert
more effort. Participants answer several comprehension checks to ensure that they have
understood the compensation scheme. They cannot proceed to the next session prior to
answering all questions correctly.
After completing the comprehension checks, participants are informed that every
condition has a control in place that requires participants to transfer at least 5 points to the
manager. Transferring mere five points can be considered a weak control, which is a
powerful condition to detect the variability in the participants’ effort (Falk & Kosfeld,
2006). When a control is strong, participants are forced to exert high effort, making it
difficult to observe negative consequences (if any) of control implementation on effort
(Belot & Schröder, 2016; Falk & Kosfeld, 2006; Tyran & Feld, 2006).
Before making a transfer, depending on the condition, participants are informed
whether the control is present either because of their manager’s decision or because of
their company’s policy, which is beyond the manager’s authority. Participants are also
informed that the reasoning behind control implementation is for monitoring or
coordinating purposes (details are explained below). After making a transfer, participants
fill out a series of post-experimental questions related to manipulation checks, their

4

Participants are told that the manager is real, not fictitious, person.
To mitigate the risk of fairness perceptions, I do not inform participants about their manager’s initial
endowment. The manager receives zero points as an initial endowment.
5
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perceptions of vertical collective identity, intrinsic motivation, social value orientation,
and demographic information.

4.1.2. Participants
I recruit all participants using the Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) online
platform. For each condition, I recruit around 30 workers as employees, so the total
number of participants is 271 workers; 55% of participants are male. On average, the
participants have 16 years of work experience and are 37 years old. Sixty-one percent of
participants have supervisory or managerial experience and the average length of
supervisory experience is 6 years.
I recruit the AMT workers who are located in the United States and consider
English as their native language. The minimum age of participants is 18 years old. Each
participant earns a show-up fee of $1.50. Participants are also told that they can earn a
possible bonus pay up to $1.45.6 In addition, I employ a doctoral student, who is also an
AMT user, as a confederate who assumes the manager role. Employing a real confederate
allows me to avoid having a fictitious manager and enables me to tell the participants that
their transfer decisions have real economic consequences to their manager. The
confederate earns 10% of the total points transferred by participants from all nine
conditions. The total number of points transferred by all participants is 10,675 points
(equivalent to $106.75). Hence, the confederate earns $10.68 from this study. Again, to
mitigate the risk of fairness perceptions (see footnote 6), the experimental materials do

6

More discussion about the possible bonus pay can be found at Section 4.1.4, Dependent and Mediating
Variables.
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tell participants about the details of this arrangement. Participants are only told that
transferring more points allows their manager to earn higher bonus pay.

Qualifications and Quality Control of AMT Workers
The AMT site has been increasingly popular among accounting studies because it
provides behavioral researchers convenient access to a large participant pool at a low
cost. However, data quality is one of the major concerns facing experimental studies that
capitalize on the AMT site to recruit participants. The biggest issue is that AMT workers
may not be attentive respondents given the fact that internet-based studies lose some
experimental controls provided by the traditional laboratory settings. Prior studies
suggest two measures to improve data quality: approval ratings and instructional
manipulation checks. First, restricting participation to AMT workers with high reputation
(above 95% approval rating) is effective to combat the data quality issues (Peer,
Vosgerau, & Acquisti, 2014). Workers with high reputation are motivated to pay close
attention to the experiment’s instructions due to their fear of having their work
submission rejected, thereby hurting their approval ratings. Second, instructional
manipulation checks allow researchers to filter out participants who fail to follow
instructions. Instruction manipulation checks, often called as “trap questions”, are special
attention checks that instruct participants to ignore the standard response format and
submit a non-intuitive response instead (Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009).
This special command is hidden in a large block of instruction; hence, it is likely that
inattentive respondents miss the command.
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I include both strategies in my experimental design in order to obtain quality data.
First, participants of this study have to meet the following eligibility criteria: (1) their
approval rates of prior tasks should be above 98% and (2) the number of prior tasks
completed in the AMT platform is above than 10,000 tasks. The AMT platform makes it
possible for me to impose these qualifications before the workers begin my task. Second,
I place one instructional manipulation check as the second to last question of my
experimental tasks. The instructional manipulation check tells participants that failure to
follow the special instruction embedded in this check will make them lose their bonus
pay. Consistent with the expectation that workers with high reputation complete tasks
attentively, only one out of 271 workers failed the instructional manipulation.7

4.1.3. Independent Variables
Control Source
To manipulate the level of control source, I develop scripts that tell participants
about who is responsible for the control implementation. The script for the endogenoussource condition prescribes that the manager has the authority to implement a control that
requires employees to transfer at least five points, and that the manager has decided to do
so. In contrast, the script for the exogenous-source condition tells participants that the
company’s executive management has decided to implement the control, and this
decision is beyond the manager’s authority. The unknown-source condition does not
provide participants the information about the responsible party.

7

Results are unchanged if the responses of this worker is included; therefore, I retain all participants’
responses in my dataset.
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The scripts also use linguistic variations to emphasize different control sources.
Specifically, prior findings suggest that pronouns reinforce and perpetuate perceptions
about relationships (see, e.g., Fitzsimons & Kay, 2004; Gustafsson Sendén et al., 2013;
Perdue et al., 1990; Sela, Wheeler, & Sarial-Abi, 2012; Tu, Shaw, & Fishbach, 2016). On
the one hand, the pronoun “I” or “my” acknowledges ownership (Newman, Pennebaker,
Berry, & Richards, 2003); therefore, these pronouns reinforce the message that the source
of control is endogenous. On the other hand, since the pronoun “they” or “their” shifts
ownership to another party, these pronouns can be used to emphasize the exogenous
source of controls (Gustafsson Sendén et al., 2013; Perdue et al., 1990). Hence, I include
10 words of “I” or “my” and 10 words of “they” or “their” in the endogenous-control and
the exogenous-control” conditions, respectively.

Control Framing
Similar to the study of Liu et al. (2015), I manipulate the level of control framing
by informing participants about the reasoning behind control implementation. In the
monitoring-frame condition, participants are told that the purpose of control
implementation is “to prevent employees from producing transferring fewer resources
than the division needs.” Essentially, participants are informed that the control is
designed to restrict the employees’ opportunities to keep all resources for themselves. In
contrast, the script for the coordinating-frame condition tells participants that the purpose
of control implementation is “to optimize resource allocation and coordinate resources
more efficiently.” The script for the no-frame condition” does not inform participants
about the purpose of control implementation.
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In addition, I rely on pronoun variations again to enhance the perceived purposes
of control implementation. Specifically, the pronoun “you” or “your” reinforces the
perception of distant relationships and the assignment of blame (Olekalns, Brett, &
Donohue, 2010; Seider, Hirschberger, Nelson, & Levenson, 2009). Essentially, the
pronoun “you” or “your” perpetuates the need for monitoring others’ behavior.
Therefore, I include 10 words of the pronoun “you” or “your” in the script for the
monitoring-frame condition. In contrast, because the pronoun “we”, “us”, or “our”
perpetuates the perception of close relationships and togetherness (Fitzsimons & Kay,
2004; Perdue et al., 1990), these pronouns emphasize the message of collaboration. In the
monitoring-frame condition, I include 10 words of the pronoun “we”, “us”, or “our.” The
overview of the experimental instrument is provided in Appendix.

4.1.4. Dependent and Mediating Variables
Baiman (1982) defines that the operationalization of effort has to meet the
following criteria: (a) effort is costly to the agent; (b) the cost of effort increases with the
level of effort; (c) an increase in agent’s effort results in a gain of welfare for both the
principal and the agent; and (d) the agent experiences disutility from choosing a higher
effort level. To ensure that I follow the criteria above, I measure effort as my dependent
variable (Employee Effort) based on the number of points transferred. As mentioned
earlier, participants are told that they can demonstrate their effort level by contributing
partial or all points of their endowment to their division (the total points of initial
endowment: 65 points, which is worth $0.65). Specifically, participants can choose their
effort level from 5 to 65 points, and they can increase the contribution of their effort by
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increments of 5 points. The remaining points of endowment after contribution is
converted to be real dollars and paid as a bonus pay. Consequently, contributing more
points is costly for participants because it will reduce the amount of their bonus pay.
At the same time, participants are also informed that exerting more effort will
allow them to achieve a high outcome. Adapting from the study of Hannan et al. (2005), I
link the cost of effort to the probability of achieving the high outcome. Participants are
told that increasing their level of effort by 5 points will raise their chance by 5% to earn
an extra bonus pay of $0.80. A lottery will be drawn based on the probability
corresponding to one’s effort level choice. Before choosing their effort levels,
participants review a table that shows the probability of winning the extra bonus of $0.80
for each of the 13 possible effort level choices. The table is the part of the experimental
materials provided in Appendix.
After measuring the dependent variable, I also measure the mediating variable,
Vertical Collective Identity in post-experimental questions. I use the Inclusion of Other in
the Self (IOS) scale (Aron et al., 2004) as the main indicator of Vertical Collective
Identity. The IOS Scale is a widely used measure for gauging the closeness of a
relationship and appears to be robust in terms of reliability, as well as the predictive
validity (Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Aron et al., 2004).
I also develop the supporting indicator of Vertical Collective Identity based on
eight questions adapted from prior literature (Steffens, Haslam, Reicher, et al., 2014; B.
van Knippenberg & van Knippenberg, 2005). The questionnaire uses a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree). The Cronbach’s alpha of
the eight items is 0.96. I also run the factor analysis to evaluate the convergent and
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divergent validity of this supporting measure. The factor analysis generates only one
factor with eigenvalues greater than 1 (6.31), which explain around 78.87% of the overall
variance. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measured of sampling adequacy is high (0.96).
Overall, the results indicate that the items are capable of measuring vertical collective
identity as a distinct construct.

Potential Covariates
I measure two potential covariates in this study. First, as prior literature suggests
that intrinsic motivation is the main driver of effort (Ryan & Deci, 2000), I measure the
participants’ levels of their overall intrinsic motivation (Intrinsic Motivation). Adapting
from the study of Elliot and Harackiewicz (1994), I develop five question items as the
measure of intrinsic motivation. The Cronbach’s alpha of these five items is 0.83,
indicating high internal consistency. The factor analysis supports the divergent and
convergent validity of the construct: it generates only one factor with an eigenvalue
greater than 1 (3.05) and explains 61% of the variance. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure
of sampling adequacy is high (0.83).
Second, I measure the participants’ social value orientation (Social Orientation).
Individuals with a high prosocial orientation likely develop close relationships and shared
identities with others (De Cremer, Van Knippenberg, Van Dijk, & Van Leeuwen, 2008);
consequently, the degree of social orientation affects the strength of vertical collective
identity. To measure Social Orientation, I utilize nine items of decomposed games
developed by Van Lange, Otten, De Bruin, and Joireman (1997). These measures are
well validated in psychology research (see, e.g. Messick & McClintock, 1968; Van Lange

32

& Kuhlman, 1994). Each item asks participants to choose one among three options; each
option gives participants the different proportion of a hypothetical payoff for oneself and
another person. These options represent three groups of social value orientations (in the
order of prosocial degree): competitive, individualistic, and prosocial orientations. An
individual is categorized as competitive, individualistic, or prosocial if this person selects
at least six choices out of nine items that belong to a particular social orientation group.

Additional Measures
I evaluate the participants’ perceptions of control source and control framing in
the post-experimental questions. Both Perceived Control Source and Perceived Control
Frame serve as attention checks of the main conditions of this study. In addition,
Perceived Control Frame is used to test Hypothesis 3A. Participants respond to one item
that measures Perceived Control Frame. Participants are invited to choose between
Option A (“I think the policy is designed to monitor and restrict employees’ behavior”)
and Option B (“I think the policy is designed to facilitate the coordination of employees’
effort”). Similarly, participants respond to one item that measures Perceived Control
Source. I elicit participants’ interpretation regarding the source of control by asking them
to indicate who is responsible for the implementation of control: (a) their manager; (b)
executive management; or (c) “the text does not provide information”.

4.2.

Pilot Testing
I ran multiple rounds of pilot testing to refine the experimental task, manipulation

checks, the manipulated and measured variables, and other post-experimental questions.
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First, 50 Masters of Accounting (MAcc) students reviewed and completed the pilot test.
Ninety percent of students have work experience (average: 5 years of experience;
median: 4 years) and 42% of students have experience in supervising subordinates
(average: 1.4 years of experience). The first pilot test covered six conditions: Endogenous
Source/Monitoring

Frame,

Exogenous

Source/Monitoring

Frame,

Endogenous

Source/Coordinating Frame, Exogenous Source/Coordinating Frame, Endogenous
Source/No Frame, and Exogenous Source/No Frame.
I conducted the second and the final pilot tests with nine and six AMT workers,
respectively. Based on their responses, I adjusted the compensation amount and refined
the clarity of case materials in order to increase the salience manipulation of independent
variables.
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5.
5.1.

RESULTS

Descriptive Statistics

5.1.1. Descriptive Statistics of Employee Effort and Vertical Collective Identity
Across Conditions
In Table 1, I present descriptive statistics of the number of points transferred
(Employee Effort) across all conditions. Figure 4 displays the means plot for all
conditions.

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of Employee Effort (All Conditions)

No Frame
Unknown
Source
Control
Source

Endogenous
Exogenous

42.00
(23.47)
n = 30
27.83
(25.62)
n = 30
36.50
(25.67)
n = 30
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Control Framing
Monitoring
Frame
38.83
(23.33)
n = 30
41.17
(24.41)
n = 30
37.26
(23.34)
n = 31

Coordinating
Frame
34.67
(23.34)
n = 30
36.50
(26.53)
n = 30
43.83
(23.55)
n = 30

Figure 4: Means Plot of Employee Effort (All Conditions)
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When the control frame is absent, the pattern of results shown in Figure 4 is
consistent with the findings of prior literature: the endogenous control yields lower effort
compared to effort level in the conditions where the control source is not known or the
control source is exogenous. However, the patterns of results of main treatments do not
appear to support my predictions: participants in the Exogenous Source/Monitoring
condition seem to exert lower effort than those in the control group or in the Endogenous
Source/Monitoring condition, a direction that contradicts my first hypothesis.
Also, the average effort of the Endogenous/Coordinating condition appears to be
lower than the average effort of the Exogenous/Coordinating condition or, surprisingly,
that of the Endogenous Source/Monitoring Condition. Overall, the patterns of results are
the opposite of my expectations.
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Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the scores of vertical collective identity
on all conditions. Figure 5 plots the patterns of results.8

Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Vertical Collective Identity (All Conditions)

No Frame
Unknown
Source
Control
Source

Endogenous
Exogenous

Again,

I

find

a

2.93
(1.70)
n = 30
2.83
(1.49)
n = 30
2.93
(1.60)
n = 30
surprising

pattern:

Control Framing
Monitoring
Frame
2.83
(1.70)
n = 30
2.67
(1.42)
n = 30
3.10
(1.54)
n = 31
participants

in

Coordinating
Frame
3.27
(1.60)
n = 30
2.53
(1.46)
n = 30
3.40
(1.45)
n = 30
the

Endogenous

Source/Coordinating condition report seemingly lower scores of vertical collective
identity than those in the control group or any other treatment groups. The patterns
depicted in Figure 4 and Figure 5 imply that, unexpectedly, the combination of
endogenous control and a coordinating frame hurts the social identity shared between
employees and their manager, thus lowering employee effort.

8

I find similar patterns and results (untabulated) in all statistical tests that I perform using the alternative
measure of vertical collective identity.
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Figure 5: Means Plot of Vertical Collective Identity (All Conditions)
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5.1.2. Descriptive Statistics of Covariates
Social Orientation
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the first covariate, Social Orientation,
across conditions. The Social Orientation scale measures participants’ social value
orientation based on their responses to nine hypothetical situations. A lower score on this
scale indicates higher prosocial orientation (1 = prosocial; 2 = individualistic; 3 =
competitive). Table 3 suggests that most participants perceive themselves as prosocial
beings.
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Social Orientation (All Conditions)
Control Framing
Monitoring
Frame
1.33
(0.55)
n = 30
1.30
(0.53)
n = 30
1.26
(0.51)
n = 31

No Frame
Unknown
Source
Control
Source

Endogenous
Exogenous

1.50
(0.63)
n = 30
1.40
(0.62)
n = 30
1.33
(0.61)
n = 30

Coordinating
Frame
1.27
(0.64)
n = 30
1.20
(1.46)
n = 30
1.33
(0.55)
n = 30

The statistical test reported on Table 4 indicates that covariate means do not differ
across nine conditions. Since Social Orientation does not vary systematically across
conditions, I conclude that the random assignment is successful and prevents Social
Orientation from correlating with other variables across conditions, including the
treatment variables themselves.

Table 4: One-Way ANOVA Test: Social Orientation Means Across Conditions
df
8
8
262

Model
Conditions
Error
R-square: 1.91%

MS
0.2278
0.2278
0.3573

F
0.64
0.64

p-value
0.75
0.75

Intrinsic Motivation
Table 5 presents the descriptive statistics of the second covariate, Intrinsic
Motivation, across conditions. The Social Orientation scale measures participants’ levels
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of intrinsic motivation when completing their AMT tasks, which are rated on a 7-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (very unmotivated) to 7 (very motivated).

Table 5: Descriptive Statistics of Intrinsic Motivation (All Conditions)
Control Framing
Monitoring
Frame
4.78
(1.17)
n = 30
4.59
(1.41)
n = 30
4.15
(1.35)
n = 31

No Frame
Unknown
Source
Control
Source

Endogenous
Exogenous

4.59
(1.12)
n = 30
4.45
(1.53)
n = 30
3.86
(1.41)
n = 30

Coordinating
Frame
4.23
(1.44)
n = 30
4.01
(1.08)
n = 30
4.49
(1.10)
n = 30

The statistical test reported on Table 6 indicates that covariate means do not differ
across nine conditions. Since Intrinsic Motivation does not vary systematically across
conditions, I conclude that the random assignment is successful and prevents Intrinsic
Motivation from correlating with other variables across conditions, including the
treatment variables themselves.

Table 6: One-Way ANOVA Test: Intrinsic Motivation Means Across Conditions
df
8
8
262

Model
Conditions
Error
R-square: 1.91%
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MS
2.7704
2.7704
1.6910

F
1.64
1.64

p-value
0.11
0.11

5.2.

Tests of Main Hypotheses: H1 and H2

5.2.1. Tests of H1A and H2A
Manipulation Checks
I conduct a set of two ANOVA tests to check whether the manipulations are
successful. The first ANOVA test is conducted with two levels of control source as the
independent variable and the participants’ responses on the perceived control source as
the dependent variable. Participants rate their perceptions of the source of control in a
binary scale, ranging from 1 (endogenous source) to 2 (exogenous source). Participants
are more likely to perceive the control source as an endogenous source in the endogenous
control conditions (M = 1.05, SD = 0.29) than in the exogenous conditions (M = 1.90, SD
= 0.30), F(1, 119) = 254.46, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 2.90).

Specifically, 93% of

participants passed the manipulation check. Hence, I conclude that the manipulation of
control source is successful.
The second ANOVA tests is conducted with two levels of control framing as the
independent variable and the participants’ responses on the perceived control frame as the
dependent variable. Participants rate their perceptions of the purpose of control in a
binary scale, ranging from 1 (monitoring purposes) to 2 (coordinating purposes).
Participants are more likely to rate the control frame as a coordinating frame in the
coordinating frame conditions (M = 1.93, SD = 0.25) than in the monitoring frame
conditions (M = 1.54, SD = 0.50), F(1, 119) = 29.35, p < 0.001, Cohen’s d = 0.98).
Specifically, 49% of participants failed the manipulation check. Therefore, I conclude
that the manipulation of control framing is not successful.
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Results
Table 7: ANCOVA Model of Employee Effort
df
4
1
1
1
1
116

Model
Control Source
Control Framing
Control Source x Control Framing
Intrinsic Motivation
Error
R-square: 8.99%

MS
1599.04
79.10
76.49
289.48
5327.14
558.54

F
2.86
0.14
0.14
0.52
9.54

p-value
0.03
0.71
0.71
0.47
0.00

Table 7 presents the ANCOVA test of employee effort on control source and
control framing. Controlling for the participants’ scores of intrinsic motivation, I do not
find statistical significance on the interaction of control source and control framing.
When I exclude the covariate (Intrinsic Motivation), I still fail to find statistical
significance. The results are reported in Table 8.

Table 8: ANOVA Model of Employee Effort
(Excluding Intrinsic Motivation as Covariate)
df
3
1
1
1
117

Model
Control Source
Control Framing
Control Source x Control Framing
Error
R-square: 1.50%

42

MS
356.34
88.68
27.54
955.56
599.30

F
0.59
0.15
0.05
1.59

p-value
0.62
0.70
0.83
0.21

Table 9 below shows the analyses of simple effects, which are also not
statistically significant. In sum, I fail to find support for H1A and H2A.

Table 9: Simple Effect Tests – Employee Effort
Comparisons:
Endogenous Source/Monitoring Frame vs.
Exogenous Source/Monitoring Frame
Endogenous Source/Coordinating Frame vs.
Exogenous Source/Coordinating Frame

Contrast
-1.53

Std. Err.
6.10

df
1

F
0.06

p-value
0.80

4.76

6.19

1

0.60

0.44

Figure 6: Predictive Margins Plot – Employee Effort
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Employee Effort
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Predictive Margins
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Exogenous
Control Source
Monitoring Frame

Coordinating Frame

Figure 6 above displays the plot of the means transferred points (Employee Effort)
for each combination of control source and control framing. While the results do not
differ significantly, the plot suggests that an interaction effect might be present. However,
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the direction of results is unexpected. In the coordinating frame, participants seem to
exert lower effort when the control is endogenous than when it is exogenous, which
counters with H2A. In the monitoring frame, the effort means of the exogenous control
seems to be lower, or close to, the means of the endogenous control. Again, this
directional pattern contradicts H1A. The plot also suggests that the endogenous control
with a coordinating frame does not promote effort as I have predicted; in fact,
participants in this condition appear to exert lower effort than, or the same level of effort
as, the endogenous control with a monitoring frame.

5.2.2. Tests of H1B and H2B
Table 10 below presents the ANCOVA test of vertical collective identity on
control source and control framing. Controlling for the participants’ scores of social
orientation, I also do not find statistical significance on the interaction of control source
and control framing. Likewise, the interaction effect is not statistically significant when I
exclude Social Orientation as a covariate (results are tabulated in Table 11).

Table 10: ANCOVA Model of Vertical Collective Identity
df
Model
Control Source
Control Framing
Control Source x Control Framing
Social Orientation
Error
R-square: 8.09%

4
1
1
1
1
116

44

MS

F
5.39
13.47
0.19
1.97
7.26
244.79

2.55
6.38
0.09
0.93
3.44

p-value
0.04
0.01
0.76
0.34
0.07

Table 11: ANOVA Model of Vertical Collective Identity
(Excluding Social Orientation as Covariate)
df
3
1
1
1
117

Model
Control Source
Control Framing
Control Source x Control Framing
Error
R-square: 5.36%

MS
4.76
12.71
0.22
1.44
2.15

F
2.21
5.90
0.10
0.67

p-value
0.09
0.02
0.75
0.42

Table 12 below shows the analyses of simple effects. The difference between two
cells in the monitoring frame, on the one hand, is not significant, implying that I fail to
find support for H2A.

Table 12: Simple Effect Tests – Vertical Collective Identity
Comparisons:
Endogenous
Source/Monitoring
Frame
vs.
Exogenous
Source/Monitoring Frame
Endogenous Source/Coordinating
Frame
vs.
Exogenous
Source/Coordinating Frame

Contrast
0.41

Std. df
Err.
0.37 1

1.23

0.27

0.92

0.38

6.02

0.02
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1

F

p-value

Figure 7: Predictive Margins Plot – Vertical Collective Identity
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On the other hand, I find a statistical difference between the Endogenous
Source/Coordinating and the Exogenous Source/Coordinating conditions (p-value =
0.02). However, the significant result that I find from the simple effect test above does
not necessarily support H2B. In fact, Figure 7 displays that the significant effect yields a
direction that is contrary to H2B: the means score of vertical collective identity in the
Exogenous Source/Coordinating Frame appears to be higher than in the Endogenous
Source/Coordinating Frame. In the monitoring frame, the plot displays that the
exogenous control appears to yield higher scores of vertical collective identity than the
endogenous control, a direction that is consistent with H2A. As mentioned previously,
the difference is not statistically significant (p = 0.27). Collectively, I conclude that I fail
to find support for H2A and H2B.
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5.2.3. Mediation Analysis: Tests of H1C and H2C
I perform the seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) to build my mediation
models. SUR models take into account the fact that there are multiple equations and that
the residuals for those equations may be correlated with each other (Zellner & Huang,
1962). 9 The SUR framework is suitable for mediation analysis with categorical
independent variables (UCLA: Statistical Consulting Group).

Table 13: Mediation Analysis
Model
Vertical Collective Identity (MV)
Points (DV)

RMSE

Rsquare

Chisquare

p-value

1.42

8%

10.65

0.03

22.94

11%

14.21

0.03

Vertical Collective Identity (Mediating Variable)
Coeff.
Control Source
Control Framing
Control Source x Control Framing
Social Orientation
Constant

Std. Err.

z

p-value

95% CI

0.41

0.36

1.13

0.26

-0.30

1.13

-0.18

0.37

-0.48

0.63

-0.90

0.55

0.51

0.52

0.99

0.32

-0.51

1.53

-0.43

0.23

-1.89

0.06

-0.87

0.01

3.22

0.39

8.22

0.00

2.45

3.99

Effort (Dependent Variable)
Coeff.
Vertical Collective Identity

Std. Err.

z

p-value

95% CI

1.78

1.53

1.16

0.25

-1.22

4.78

Control Source

-2.76

5.99

-0.46

0.65

-14.50

8.99

Control Framing

-2.04

6.03

-0.34

0.74

-13.85

9.77

Control Source x Control Framing

6.70

8.54

0.79

0.43

-10.03

23.44

Intrinsic Motivation

4.61

1.80

2.56

0.01

1.08

8.14

Social Orientation

-2.53

3.71

-0.68

0.50

-9.80

4.75

Constant

18.55

10.91

1.70

0.09

-2.84

39.93

9

Seemingly unrelated regression is considered a “pure” structural model, a subset of the structural-equation
modeling framework, that does not include latent variables.
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The results in Table 13 show that the root mean squared error (RMSE) values of
both models are high. As lower values of RMSE indicate better fit, the mediation analysis
reveals that both models are poorly specified. In addition, I fail to find support for the
hypothesized mediation model (i.e., H1C and H2C). I also test the significance of indirect
effect, i.e. whether the vertical collective identity mediates the relationship between
employee effort and the interaction of control source and control framing. Table 14 below
shows that the indirect effect is not significant.

Table 14: Test of Indirect Effect

Indirect effect (using delta method)

Coeff
.

Std. Err.

0.91

1.21

z
0.75

pvalue
0.45

95% CI
-1.46

3.29

The distribution of indirect effects is often skewed and violates the assumption
that it is normal distributed, making it harder to detect the effects. Therefore, it is
recommended that bootstrap standard errors and confidence intervals be used. I present
the results of bootstrapping in Table 9 below. The indirect effect is still not significant
after bootstrapping. Overall, I still cannot find empirical evidence to support H1C and
H2C.
Table 15: Test of Indirect Effect (Bootstrapping)
Bootstrap results:
(replications = 10,000)
Indirect effect (percentile CI)
Indirect effect (biased-corrected CI)

Coeff
.

Bias

Bootstr
ap Std.
Err.

0.91

-0.21

1.49
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95% CI
-1.49

4.55

-0.73

6.09

As a robustness test, I run a path analysis as an alternative mediation test. The
results of the path analysis are similar to the earlier results, suggesting that I still fail to
support H1C and H2C. Results are tabulated in Table 16 below.
Table 16: Path Analysis

Path (R-square = 7.35%)

Vertical Collective Identity
(Mediating Variable)
Std.
Coeff.
t
p-value
Err.

Control Source -> VCI

0.62

Control Framing -> VCI

0.00

Control Source x Control Framing -> VCI
Social Orientation -> VCI
Constant

Path (R-square = 10.05%)

0.36

1.13

0.26

0.04

0.13

0.31

0.76

-0.41

0.23

-1.79

0.08

2.20

0.94

2.34

0.02

Effort (Dependent Variable)
Std.
Coeff.
t
p-value
Err.

Vertical Collective Identity -> Effort
Control Source -> Effort

1.82

1.58

1.15

0.25

-0.16

4.88

-0.03

0.97

Control Framing -> Effort

0.00

Control Source x Control Framing -> Effort

0.68

2.15

0.32

0.75

Intrinsic Motivation -> Effort

4.86

1.82

2.67

0.01

Social Orientation -> Effort

-2.22

3.80

-0.58

0.56

Constant

11.34

17.59

0.64

0.52

5.3.

Tests of Additional Hypothesis: H3
H3 predicts that participants in the absence of control frame conditions will be

more likely to believe that the reason behind control implementation is for monitoring
purposes.
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Table 17: Descriptive Statistics of Employee Effort
Based on Perceived Control Purpose in the Absence of Control Framing

No Source

No Frame

Endogenous
Source

No Frame

Exogenous
Source

No Frame

Perceived Control Frame
Monitoring
Coordinating
33.75
43.26
(28.39)
(23.01)
n=4
n = 26
5.00
28.62
(0.00)
(25.70)
n=1
n = 29
5.00
38.75
(0.00)
(25.08)
n=2
n = 28

Contrary to my expectations, the results above show that 92% of participants in
the no-frame conditions perceive that the reason behind control implementation is for
coordinating purposes. Consequently, I fail to find support for H3A. I also do not find a
statistically significant result that supports H3B, although the pattern trend is consistent
with the prediction, i.e. the average of employee effort appear to be lower in the
Endogenous Source/No Frame condition (M = 27.83, SD = 27.83, n = 30) than in the
Exogenous Source/No Frame condition (M = 36.50, SD = 25.67, n = 30). At the same
time, I acknowledge that even the directional trend is consistent with H3B, the means
difference is not likely triggered by the participants’ belief that the purpose of controls in
the absence of control frame is for monitoring purposes.
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Table 18: Descriptive Statistics of Vertical Collective Identity
Based on Perceived Control Purpose in the Absence of Control Framing

No Source

No Frame

Endogenous
Source

No Frame

Exogenous
Source

No Frame

Perceived Control Frame
Monitoring
Coordinating
2.00
3.07
(0.82)
(1.76)
n=4
n = 26
2.00
2.86
(0.00)
(1.51)
n=1
n = 29
2.50
2.93
(2.12)
(1.70)
n=2
n = 28

Table 18 above shows the VCI means by conditions. I find no statistical
difference in the strength of vertical collective identity across perceived control cells
(untabulated omnibus ANOVA results: F(3, 70) = 0.83, p-value = 0.48). Accordingly, I
cannot find support for H3C. However, I find that partitioning the results based on
participants’ perceived control frame gives me a pattern consistent with my intuition: the
strength of vertical collective identity is lower when participants are more likely to
perceive that the reason behind control implementation is for monitoring purposes than
for coordinating purposes.

5.4.

Supplementary Analyses

5.4.1. Statistical Tests Based on Participants’ Perceived Control Source and
Perceived Control Framing
Given the findings I obtained when testing H3, I speculate that the overwhelming
number of people perceiving the reason behind control implementation as coordinating
purposes may influence the participants’ responses. Additionally, the manipulation of
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control framing appears to be unsuccessful: a further investigation (untabulated) reveals
that 55% of participants in the monitoring conditions perceive that the reason behind
control implementation is for coordinating purposes.
Therefore, I decide to partition the data based on the perceived control frame and
the perceived control source. I acknowledge that analyzing data using the participants’
perceptions, rather than the treatment manipulations, takes away my ability to make
causal inferences.

Table 19: Descriptive Statistics of Employee Effort on Perceived Conditions

Employee Effort
No Source
Perceived
Control
Source

Endogenous
Exogenous

Perceived Control Frame
Monitoring
Coordinating
33.75
43.91
(24.89)
(22.53)
n=8
n = 32
31.15
37.52
(25.93)
(24.41)
n = 26
n = 103
35.75
38.17
(24.51)
(24.73)
n = 20
n = 82

Table 19 shows the descriptive statistics of Employee Effort based on the
participants’ perceived control source and perceived control frame. In addition, Figure 8
displays means plots of Employee Effort for all perceived conditions.
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Figure 8: Predictive Margins Plot – Employee Effort
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Table 20: ANCOVA Model of Employee Effort
Based on Perceived Conditions
df
4
1
1
1
1
226

Model
Perceived Control Source
Perceived Control Frame
Perceived Source x Perceived Frame
Intrinsic Motivation
Error
R-square: 2.35%

MS
820.17
321.08
597.59
65.26
2223.27
603.21

F
1.36
0.53
0.99
0.11
3.69

p-value
0.25
0.47
0.32
0.74
0.06

Based on the ANCOVA shown in Table 20 above, I still fail to find support for
H1 and H2 in spite of using participants’ belief on control source and control framing.
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However, when I plot the effort means using participants’ perceived control source and
perceived control framing, some interesting patterns emerge.

Figure 9: Predictive Margins Plot – Employee Effort (Perceived Main Treatments)
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Figure 9 suggests that, when participants believe that the controls are for
monitoring purposes and imposed endogenously, they appear to exert lower effort than
those who perceive the same control frame but believe that the control is exogenous. This
direction is consistent with H1A. At the same time, when participants believe that the
controls are for coordinating purposes, the effort of participants do not seem to vary with
their perceptions of control source.
Table 21 shows the descriptive statistics of Vertical Collective Identity based on
the participants’ perceived control source and perceived control frame. In addition,
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Figure 10 displays means plots of Vertical Collective Identity for all perceived
conditions.

Table 21: Descriptive Statistics of Vertical Collective Identity
on Perceived Conditions

Perceived Control Frame
Monitoring
Coordinating
2.13
3.19
(0.99)
(1.80)
n=8
n = 32
2.69
3.09
(1.76)
(1.53)
n = 26
n = 103
2.90
2.84
(1.29)
(1.50)
n = 20
n = 82

Vertical Collective Identity
No Source
Perceived
Control
Source

Endogenous
Exogenous

Figure 10: Predictive Margins Plot – Vertical Collective Identity
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Exogenous

Perceived Purpose = Coordinating

Table 22: ANCOVA Model of Vertical Collective Identity
Based on Perceived Conditions

df
Model
Perceived Control Source
Perceived Control Frame
Perceived Source x Perceived Frame
Social Orientation
Error
R-square: 2.31%

4
1
1
1
1
226

MS

F
3.09
0.00
1.47
2.35
7.71
2.31

1.34
0.00
0.63
1.02
3.33

p-value
0.26
0.96
0.43
0.31
0.07

The ANCOVA model above does not detect a statistical significant finding using
participants’ belief on control source and control framing. On the other hand, Figure 11
plots the means of vertical collective identity for the participants’ perceived control
source and perceived control framing.

56

Figure 11: Predictive Margins Plot – Vertical Collective Identity (Perceived Main
Treatments)
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Figure 11 displays an interaction plot, which is consistent with H2A and H2B.
When participants believe that the controls are for monitoring purposes, participants rate
weaker vertical collective identity in the endogenous control than in the exogenous
control. The line trend goes in an opposite direction when participants perceive that the
controls are for coordinating purposes: the scores of participants’ vertical collective
identity are higher in the endogenous control than in the exogenous control. In sum, the
directional trend is consistent with my predictions. At the same time, I acknowledge the
pattern trend on its own is not the conclusive evidence to support my hypotheses.
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Table 23: Mediation Analysis Based on Perceived Conditions
Model
Vertical
(MV)

Rsquare

RMSE
Collective

Chisquare

pvalue

Identity

Points (DV)

1.50

2.31%

5.47

0.24

23.49

8.66%

21.92

0.00

Vertical Collective Identity
(Mediating Variable)
pvalue

Coeff.

Std. Err.

Perceived Control Source

0.27

0.45

0.59

0.55

-0.61

1.15

Perceived Control Frame
Perceived Source x Perceived
Frame

0.46

0.33

1.38

0.17

-0.19

1.11

-0.51

0.50

-1.02

0.31

-1.49

0.47

Social Orientation

-0.30

0.16

-1.85

0.07

-0.62

0.02

3.04

0.35

8.68

0.00

2.35

3.73

Constant

z

95% CI

Effort (Dependent Variable)
pvalue

Coeff.

Std. Err.

Vertical Collective Identity

3.24

1.06

3.06

0.00

1.17

5.32

Perceived Control Source

4.86

7.01

0.69

0.49

-8.88

18.60

Perceived Control Frame
Perceived Source x Perceived
Frame

5.67

5.22

1.09

0.28

-4.56

15.90

-2.79

7.86

-0.36

0.72

-18.19

12.61

1.40

1.20

1.17

0.24

-0.96

3.76

Social Orientation

-5.61

2.57

-2.18

0.03

-10.65

-0.57

Constant

23.03

7.64

3.01

0.00

8.05

38.01

Intrinsic Motivation

z

95% CI

Table 24: Test of Indirect Effect Based on Perceived Conditions
Coeff.
Indirect effect (using delta method)

-1.66

Std.
Err.
1.71
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z
-0.97

pvalue
0.33

95% CI
-5.01

1.70

Table 25: Test of Indirect Effect Based on Perceived Conditions (Bootstrapping)
Bootstrap results:
(replications = 10,000)
Indirect effect (percentile CI)
Indirect
effect
(biasedcorrected CI)

Coeff.

Bias

Bootstra
p Std.
Err.

-1.40

0.02

1.54

95% CI
-4.78

1.46

-5.23

1.12

Finally, the mediation analysis above based on the perceived conditions. I do not
find statistically significant findings that can support the expected mediation relationship.

5.4.2. Statistical Tests after Excluding Participants Who Failed Manipulation
Checks
Given the fact that a high number of participants failed the manipulation of
control framing, I run similar statistical tests after excluding those who failed in both
manipulations. Based on responses of participants who passed both manipulations, Table
26 and Table 27 report the descriptive statistics of Effort and Vertical Collective Identity,
respectively.

Table 26: Descriptive Statistics of Employee Effort
Based on Responses that Passed Manipulation Checks

Effort
Endogenous
Control
Source
Exogenous

Control Frame
Monitoring
Coordinating
27.69
38.46
(24.80)
(26.26)
n = 13
n = 26
37.67
47.80
(22.51)
(21.89)
n = 15
n = 25
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Table 27: Descriptive Statistics of Vertical Collective Identity
Based on Responses that Passed Manipulation Checks

Effort
Endogenous
Control
Source
Exogenous

Control Frame
Monitoring
Coordinating
2.92
2.57
(1.85)
(1.47)
n = 13
n = 26
3.07
3.24
(1.57)
(1.54)
n = 15
n = 25

Similar to previous results, I failed to find support for H1A, H1B, H2A, and H2B.
Results are tabulated below.

Table 28: ANCOVA Model of Employee Effort
Based on Responses that Passed Manipulation Checks
df
4
1
1
1
1
74

Model
Control Source
Control Framing
Control Source x Control Framing
Intrinsic Motivation
Error
R-square: 11.82%
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MS
1383.79
1404.24
1739.59
28.75
1921.93
558.04

F
2.48
2.52
3.12
0.05
3.44

p-value
0.05
0.12
0.08
0.82
0.07

Table 29: ANCOVA Model of Vertical Collective Identity
Based on Responses that Passed Manipulation Checks
df
4
1
1
1
1
74

Model
Control Source
Control Framing
Control Source x Control Framing
Social Orientation
Error
R-square: 4.57%

MS
2.11
3.15
0.13
1.45
2.52
2.38

F
0.89
1.32
0.06
0.61
1.06

p-value
0.48
0.25
0.81
0.44
0.31

Finally, my mediation analysis does not result in statistical significance despite
using responses that passed manipulation checks. Therefore, I cannot find evidence to
support H3. Results are tabulated in Table 30.
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Table 30: Mediation Analysis Based on Responses that Passed Manipulation Checks
Model
Vertical Collective Identity (MV)
Points (DV)

RMSE

Rsquare

Chisquare

p-value

1.49

4.57%

3.78

0.44

22.49

14.66%

13.57

0.03

Vertical Collective Identity (Mediating Variable)
Coeff.
Control Source
Control Framing
Control Source x Control Framing
Social Orientation
Constant

Std. Err.

z

p-value

95% CI

0.1338

0.5661

0.24

0.81

-0.98

1.24

-0.3705

0.5079

-0.73

0.47

-1.37

0.62

0.5692

0.7054

0.81

0.42

-0.81

1.95

-0.3166

0.2979

-1.06

0.29

-0.90

0.27

3.3127

0.5532

5.99

0.00

2.23

4.40

Effort (Dependent Variable)
Coeff.

Std. Err.

z

p-value

95% CI

Vertical Collective Identity

2.9160

1.7981

1.62

0.11

-0.61

6.44

Control Source

9.6742

8.5292

1.13

0.26

-7.04

26.39

Control Framing

12.0532

7.6737

1.57

0.12

-2.99

27.09

Control Source x Control Framing

-3.5508

10.7018

-0.33

0.74

-24.53

17.42

Intrinsic Motivation

2.8474

2.2606

1.26

0.21

-1.59

7.27

Social Orientation

0.4586

4.5963

0.10

0.92

-8.56

9.46

Constant

7.0487

13.1537

0.54

0.59

-18.73

32.83
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6.
6.1.

CONCLUSION AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS

Potential Explanations for Non-Significant Findings
Considering the findings together, I do not obtain statistically significant support

for the interaction effects of control source and control framing on employee effort.
Additionally, I fail to reject the null hypothesis of the claim that vertical collective
identity mediates the interaction effect. While I have pointed out that some of the results
display expected directions, but these directions should be interpreted with caution.
I offer potential explanations concerning the non-significant results. First, this
study may suffer from a strong social desirability bias. Recent studies have started to
urge researchers in online environments to take into account of potential social
desirability bias, which can amplify potential demand effects (Antin & Shaw, 2012).
Prior work also shows that Amazon Mechanical Turk workers tend to score higher in
social desirability (Behrend, Sharek, Meade, & Wiebe, 2011). I suspect that workers with
high reputation may suffer higher social desirability bias due to their fear for getting their
work rejected. A strong social desirability bias might explain why 55% of participants in
the monitoring conditions believe that the controls are framed for coordinating purposes.
I also find that the manipulation of control framing results in a much weaker effect size
(Cohen’s d = 0.98) than the manipulation of control source (Cohen’s d = 2.90), which is
probably the consequence of social desirability bias. In short, social desirability bias
might lead the treatments of this study to be ineffective.
However, social desirability bias does not explain why the participants in the
Endogenous Source /Monitoring Frame condition, who believe that the controls are for
coordinating purposes, exert higher effort (M = 51.47, SD = 4.59, n = 17) than the
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participants in the Endogenous Source/Coordinating Frame condition (M = 37.78, SD =
5.00, n = 27) who also believe that the controls are for coordinating purposes. The
difference is statistically significant (p-value = 0.034). While I do not make a formal
hypothesis concerning to this difference, it is surprising that the outcome of the
Endogenous Source/Coordinating Frame condition is not as favorable as I have thought.
I speculate that another theory is at work. The prior literature points out that
persuasive messages can backfire if the messages unintentionally make the recipient
aware of the sender’s potentially self-serving motives (Ert et al., 2014). In this study, if
participants buy into the invitation to collaborate, participants are expected to contribute
more points, which will benefit their manager financially. Contrary to the expectation, I
find that many participants responded to this message cynically, stating it as the
manager’s attempt to profit from the participants’ hard work. Interestingly, in the
monitoring conditions, many participants believe that “tough” messages are often
necessary to prevent others from shirking effort; hence, these participants perceive that
the controls are in place for coordinating purposes. Consequently, they are also more
willing to contribute more. A potential theoretical explanation for this finding is that
negatively framed messages can be more persuasive and credible (Maheswaran &
Meyers-Levy, 1990) especially when the circumstances call for a “healthy” suspicion
(Hardin, 2004; Lumineau, 2014).
Overall, while this study does not find significant results, the study indicates that
our understanding of control framing and control source is still wanting. Prior work
emphasizes the needs for conveying messages that promote collaboration; yet, those
studies do not discuss the potential backfire effects that can come from such messages. I
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agree with Liu et al. (2015), who argue that future research is needed to explore the
effects of different control frames. Finally, this study also suggests the detrimental effects
of the failure to consider the strength of social desirable bias in online responses.
Considering that online labor market has become an attractive alternative to student or
scarce professional respondents, we need to further our understanding of how social
desirability bias influences existing results and how we can address this challenge in
future research.

6.2.

Opportunities for Future Research
Limitations of my study provide opportunities for future research. First, given the

speculation that the monitoring frame appears to be more effective than the coordinating
frame in some circumstances, future research may explore attributes of control framing
that can enhance or undermine the effectiveness of controls. For instance, when do
people view monitoring-framed controls as controls that are made for monitoring
purposes rather than those that are made for coordinating purposes? Likewise, when do
persuasive messages not backfire? Specifically, when do people not cynically respond to
endogenous controls that claim to enhance collaboration? When investigating these
questions, future research may examine the role of linguistic cues in shaping the
credibility and the persuasiveness of messages (Petty & Cacioppo, 1986) that are
intended to frame the purposes of controls.
Second, due to the design choice, my study does not investigate the managers’
perceived strength of vertical collective identity. This study assumes that the managers
also see themselves as sharing the same degree of social identity with their employees.
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Contrary to this assumption, identity misfit is possible to occur in the leader-subordinate
relationships (D. van Knippenberg, 2011), but prior work has not investigated the
presence of this phenomenon in accounting settings. In addition, future research may also
investigate whether and how controls can be a tool to re-align identity misfit, if any.
Third, this study only examines the effect of formal controls on developing the
social identity shared between managers and employees. It is possible that informal
controls may be as important as, or more important than, formal controls to enhance
vertical collective identity. Furthermore, it is also interesting to examine the interaction
effects of formal and informal controls on vertical collective identity, especially in the
situation when these forms of controls send divergent social cues.
Fourth, future research may examine the effects of nested social identities.
Employees might categorize themselves either at a subgroup level (e.g. at a business-unit
level) or at a collective level (e.g. at a firm level). The subgroup interests sometimes
conflict with the collective interests (Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008; Lee et al.,
2012; Wit & Kerr, 2002). Future studies can explore how the conflicting interests in
nested social identities determine the effectiveness of controls, or how controls can be
designed to remedy the problem.
Finally, future research may investigate the impact of social identity relative to
the impact of social norms on employee effort. Recent studies suggest that management
control design can activate social norms (Cardinaels & Yin, 2015; Douthit, Schwartz,
Stevens, & Young, 2017; Maas & Van Rinsum, 2013), thereby affecting employee effort.
It is not clear though, whether the effects of social norms would disappear once the
presence of social identity was taken into account. While prior work agrees that
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communication at the group level enhances group-oriented behavior, scholars have been
debating why communication improves cooperation. There are two opposing theoretical
camps within this debate: the proponents of the social identity explanation versus the
proponents of the norm-based explanation. Prior literature suggests disparate results:
some studies document the behavioral effects of social identity irrespective of social
norms (see, e.g. Orbell, van de Kragt, & Dawes, 1988), other studies observe the working
of norms (see, e.g. Bicchieri, 2002). Since both social identity and social norms are
context-specific, it will be insightful to learn the attributes of controls that can induce
social norms, social identity, or both.

6.3.

Epilogue
My first takeaway from this study is that the participant selection is crucial to a

successful experiment. I assumed that AMT workers with high reputation would
represent quality participants, but my assumption was wrong. It appears that workers with
high reputation likely respond to questions in a manner that will presumably be viewed
favorably by experimenters. The reason is that the workers are afraid that unfavorable
answers will lead the experimenter to reject their work, hurting their reputation. Second,
since AMT workers have a lot supervisory and managerial experience, they are likely to
be responsible for framing a control at their workplaces. Therefore, it is difficult to
manipulate their perception of control framing because they can ‘see through’ the real
purpose of control. Hence, these findings suggest that college or masters students might
be more representative proxy for common, non-managerial employees.
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Second, while the prior literature indicates that a typical way to frame control is
by communicating the purposes of control to employees, it seems that this approach is
not powerful enough to manipulate control framing in an experimental setting.
Experimental economics studies suggest alternative ways to induce framing effects that
can impact different levels of participants’ social identity and cooperative effort (Parks,
Joireman, & Van Lange, 2013). A succinct yet powerful way is by structuring the
experimental games as give-some versus take-same dilemmas (De Dreu & McCusker,
1997). Alternatively, experimenters can also design the games such that the nature of
participants’ initial endowments is framed as private as opposed to community property
(Muehlbacher & Kirchler, 2009). In short, structuring the experimental games, rather
than merely labeling the games, might work more effectively to increase the framing
effect.
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APPENDIX: EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
(Demographics of Participants)
Q1. You are: __ Female __Male
Q2. How old are you? ____
Q3. Do you have work experience? __Yes __No
Q4. (If Yes to Q3) How long is your work experience? __ years
Q5. (If Yes to Q3) Do you have supervisory or managerial experience? __Yes __No
Q6. (If Yes to Q5) How long is your supervisory/managerial experience? __ years
Q7. (Intrinsic Motivation Scale) Rate your experience as AMT workers in the scale from
1 (“Disagree”) to 7 (“Agree):

In general, I enjoy working in AMT.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I find that most AMT tasks are boring.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I only work in AMT for money.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I have fun in completing AMT tasks.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Regardless the pay amount, I am 1
always motivated to complete my
AMT tasks.

2

3

4

5

6

7
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(Main Instrument)
In this study, assume that you are an employee of PQR, Inc. You are working in Division
X under the supervision of Manager A.
Like you, Manager A is a real, anonymous Amazon Mechanical Turk worker who has
agreed to participate in this survey. Currently, Manager A is supervising around 30
employees (i.e. fellow Turk workers).
It is now early January 2017, and you receive a memo sent by Manager A to all
employees of Division X:

Internal Memo
From: Manager A
To:

Employees of Division X

I would like to take this opportunity to thank you for all your hard work in 2016. With
your help, we achieved our sales targets successfully last year. In 2017, we will be facing
new opportunities and challenges, and our job is to continue providing our customers
with the best products and services on the market.
I look forward to working together with you all in 2017.
Thank you,
Manager A
Please proceed to the next page.
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At PQR Inc., the performance of a division increases as employees put in more effort
(i.e., work harder). In this setting, employees can demonstrate the level of their effort by
contributing “points” to their division.
Each employee, including you, has an initial endowment of 65 points. Hence, the
maximum effort you can contribute to your division is 65 points.
If a division receives more points from its employees, the performance of this division
will thrive. When the performance of a division increases, its employees will be more
likely to earn bonus compensation.
As you can see from the table below, the more points you contribute, the higher the
likelihood to earn your bonus pay of $0.80. At the same time, if Division X performs
well, Manager A will likely earn some bonus pay too. The bonus pay will be paid to
Manager A’s Amazon Mechanical Turk account.
Note that your initial endowment is worth $0.01/point, so the total value of your initial
endowment is $0.65. The remaining points of your endowment after your contribution
will be converted to be real dollars and paid to your Amazon Mechanical Turk account
after you have submitted this HIT. Your contributions increase by increments of 5 points.
Example:
If you decide to contribute 50 points, your contribution cost is $0.50. Hence, the
remaining initial endowment to be paid at the end of HIT is $0.15. In addition, based on
the table below, a 50-point contribution will allow you to a 75% chance to earn $0.80
bonus pay. A lottery will be drawn based on this probability. If you win, the $1 bonus pay
will also be paid at the end of HIT.

Contribution
Level (Points)
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
45
50
55
60
65

Your Contribution Cost

Probability of Earning $0.80 Bonus Pay

$0.05
$0.10
$0.15
$0.20
$0.25
$0.30
$0.35
$0.40
$0.45
$0.50
$0.55
$0.60
$0.65

30%
35%
40%
45%
50%
55%
60%
65%
70%
75%
80%
85%
90%

Please proceed to the next page.
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(Comprehension Checks)
Q1. Based on the table above, if you decide to contribute 15 points to your division, how
much is your contribution cost?
A) $0.30
B) $0.45
C) $0.15
Q2. If you decide to contribute 15 points to your division, how much is the remaining
amount of your initial endowment?
A) $0.50
B) $0.85
C) $0.15
Q3. If you contribute more points to your division, what will happen to Manager A’s
compensation?
A) Decrease.
B) Increase.
C) Unchanged.
Please proceed to the next page.
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(Endogenous/Monitoring Condition) Manager A was given a choice and has decided to
implement a new policy that requires each employee to contribute at least 5 points.
Manager A explains the purpose of this policy in the following memo:

Internal Memo
From: Manager A
To:

Employees of Division X

I will implement a policy that will require you to contribute at least 5 points to ensure that
your contribution can cover core expenses of Division X throughout the year. I want
you to know that I made this decision, and it is within my authority.
I will use my policy to restrict your ability to keep all of your points for yourself. I
believe that if you transfer fewer than what I have required, you will hurt the business of
Division X.
Essentially, I decided to implement my policy to prevent you from spending too little
of your effort at the division’s expense.
Regards,
Manager A

Please proceed to the next page.
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(Exogenous/Monitoring Condition) The executive management of PQR, Inc. has
decided to implement a new policy that requires each employee to contribute at least 5
points. This decision is beyond Manager A’s authority.
Manager A explains the purpose of this policy in the following memo:

Internal Memo
From: Manager A
To:

Employees of Division X

Executive management will implement a policy that will require you to contribute at least
5 points because they want to ensure that your contribution can cover core expenses of
Division X throughout the year. Executive management wants you to know that the
decision came from them, and it is beyond my authority.
Executive management will use their policy to restrict your opportunities to keep all
of your points for yourself. They believe that if you transfer fewer than what they have
required, you will hurt the business of Division X.
Essentially, executive management decided to implement their policy to prevent you
from spending too little of your effort at the division’s expense.
Regards,
Manager A

Please proceed to the next page.
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(Endogenous/Coordinating Condition) Manager A was given a choice and has decided
to implement a new policy that requires each employee to contribute at least 5 points.
Manager A explains the purpose of this policy in the following memo:

Internal Memo
From: Manager A
To:

Employees of Division X

I will implement a policy that will require our employees to contribute at least 5 points to
ensure that our contribution can cover core expenses of Division X throughout the year. I
want all of us to know that I made this decision, and it is within my authority.
I will use my policy to facilitate the coordination of our effort in our division. If our
employees transfer fewer than what I have required, we will hurt the business of our
division.
Essentially, I decided to implement my policy because it will promote our
cooperation, which I believe is in our best interests.
Regards,
Manager A

Please proceed to the next page.
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(Exogenous/Coordinating Condition) The executive management of PQR, Inc. has
decided to implement a new policy that requires each employee to contribute at least 5
points. This decision is beyond Manager A’s authority.
Manager A explains the purpose of this policy in the following memo:

Internal Memo
From: Manager A
To:

Employees of Division X

Executive management will implement a policy that will require our employees to
contribute at least 5 points because they want to ensure that our contribution can cover
core expenses of Division X throughout the year. Executive management wants all of
us to know that the decision came from them, and it is beyond my authority.
Executive management will use their policy to facilitate our effort coordination in
our division. If our employees transfer fewer than what they have required, we would
hurt the business of our division.
Essentially, executive management decided to implement their policy because it will
promote our cooperation, which they believe is in our best interests.
Regards,
Manager A

Please proceed to the next page.
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(Endogenous Only Condition) Manager A was given a choice and has decided to
implement a new policy that requires each employee to contribute at least 5 points.
Manager A announces this policy in the following memo:

Internal Memo
From: Manager A
To:

Employees of Division X

My policy will require employees to contribute at least 5 points. My policy will ensure
that the total contributions can cover core expenses of Division X throughout the year.
Since I have the authority to implement a policy, I have decided that I will
implement such a policy in Division X.
Regards,
Manager A

Please proceed to the next page.
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(Exogenous Only Condition) The executive management of PQR, Inc. has decided to
implement a new policy that requires each employee to contribute at least 5 points. This
decision is beyond Manager A’s authority.
Manager A announces this policy in the following memo:

Internal Memo
From: Manager A
To:

Employees of Division X

Executive management has decided that they will implement a policy in Division X.
Their policy will require employees to contribute at least 5 points. Their policy will
ensure that the total contributions can cover core expenses of Division X throughout the
year.
Executive management states that the decision came from them, and it is beyond my
authority.
Regards,
Manager A

Please proceed to the next page.
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(Monitoring Only Condition) You learned about a new policy that requires each
employee to contribute at least 5 points. You can find the announcement of this policy in
the following memo:

Internal Memo
To:

Employees of Division X

This policy is designed to restrict your ability to keep the points for yourself. If you
transfer fewer than what has been required, you will hurt the business of Division X.
Essentially, this policy will prevent you from spending too little of effort at the
division’s expense.

Please proceed to the next page.
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(Coordinating Only Condition) You learned about a new policy that requires each
employee to contribute at least 5 points. You can find the announcement of this policy in
the following memo:

Internal Memo
To:

Employees of Division X

This policy is designed to facilitate the coordination of our effort in Division X. If
employees transfer fewer than what has been required, we will hurt the business of our
division.
Essentially, this policy will promote our cooperation, which is in our best interests.

Please proceed to the next page.
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(Control Only Condition) You learned about a new policy that requires each employee
to contribute at least 5 points.

Please proceed to the next page.

81

IMPORTANT
First, recall that the more points you contribute, the higher the likelihood to earn your
bonus pay of $0.80. However, your contribution will cost you $0.01/point. Your initial
endowment is 65 points, which are worth $0.65. If Division X receives more points from
its employees, the performance of this division will thrive. At the same time, if Division
X performs well, Manager A will likely earn some bonus pay too.

Second, below is the message you have read previously: (based on the treatment
condition)

Q1a. (Employee Effort Scale) Indicate the number of points you would transfer to
Division X.
The number of points you’d like to transfer: ___________ points.
5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

55

60

65

Q1b. Explain the reasoning behind your decision:

Q2a. (Perceived Control Source) Who decided to implement the policy?
A) Manager X.
B) Executive management.
C) The text did not tell me who decided to implement the policy.
Q2b. (Perceived Control Frame) What do you think is most likely purpose of
implementing the policy:
A) The policy is designed to monitor and restrict employees’ behavior.
B) The policy is designed to facilitate the coordination of employees’ effort.
Please proceed to the next page.
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Q3. (Please rate the extent to which you agree with each of the following statements,
using the scale from 1 (“Strongly Disagree”) to 7 (“Strongly Agree”):
Manager A shared a common interest
with me.
Manager A made the decision in my
best interest.
Manager A made me feel a sense of
belonging in Division X.
Manager A made me believe that I
matter to Division X.
Manager A stimulated my motivation
to exert effort for Division X.
Manager A increased my optimism
about the future of Division X.
Manager A motivated me to focus more
on Division X’s best interests.
I am willing to support Manager A.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I feel that Manager A trusted me.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I feel that Manager A believed in my
integrity at work.
I feel that Manager A believed in my
competence to put in effort for Division
X.
I feel that Manager A gave me the
autonomy to make decisions.
Manager A is trustworthy.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

I would be comfortable giving Manager
A a task or problem that was critical to
me, even if I could not monitor
Manager A’s action.
If someone questioned Manager A’s
motives, I would give Manager A the
benefit of the doubt.
I would be willing to let Manager A
have complete control over my future
in this company.
I really wish I had a way to keep an eye
on Manager A.
If I had my way, I wouldn’t let
Manager A have any influence over
issues that are important to me.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1

2

3

4

5

6

7
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Q4. (Vertical Collective Identity Scale) Select the letter below (ranging from A to G) that
best illustrates your perception about how the relationship between you and your manager
encourages the shared sense of ‘us’:

Please proceed to the next page.
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(Instructional Manipulation Check)
When a big news story breaks, people often go online to get up-to-the-minute details on
what is going on. We want to know from which websites people trust to get this
information. We also want to know if people are paying attention to this question. To
show that you have read this far, please ignore the question and select The Drudge Report
and National Public Radio (NPR) as your two answers.
When there is a big news story, which is the one news website you would visit first?
(Please only choose one):
New York Times website

The Drudge Report

Huffington Post
Washington Post website

Google News
ABC News website

CNN.com
FoxNews.com
MSNBC.com

CBS News website
NBC News website
Yahoo! News

Please proceed to the next page.

85

The Associated Press (AP)
website
Reuters website
National
Public
Radio
(NPR) website
USA Today website
New York Post website
None of these websites

Rate the extent to which you believe that Manager A is a real, anonymous Amazon
Mechanical Turk worker using the scale from 1 (“Strongly Unbelievable”) to 7
(“Strongly Believable”):
1

2

3

4

Please proceed to the next page.
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5

6

7

(Social Orientation Scale) Note that this task is independent from the previous tasks you
have completed.
In this task, we ask you to imagine that you have been randomly paired with another
person, who we will refer simply as the “Other.” This other person is someone you do not
know and who you will not know in the future. Both you and the “Other” will be making
choices by circling either the letter A, B, or C. Your own choices will produce dollars for
both yourself and the “Other”. Likewise, the other’s choice will produce dollars for
him/her and for you. The more dollars you receive, the better for you, and the more
dollars the “Other” receives, the better for him/her.

Here’s an example of how this task works:
You get
“Other” gets

A
$500
$100

B
$500
$500

C
$550
$300

In this example, if you chose A, you would receive $500 and “Other” would receive
$100; if you chose B, you would receive $500 and “Other” $500; and if you chose C, you
would receive $550 and “Other” $300. So, you see that your choice influences both the
number of points you receive and the number of points the “Other” receives.
Before you begin making choices, please keep in mind that there are no right or wrong
answers – choose the option that you, for whatever reason, prefer most. Also, remember
that the more dollars you accumulate, the better for you. Likewise, from the “Other’s”
point of view, the more dollars s/he accumulates, the better for him/her.
For each of the nine choice situations, choose A, B, or C depending on which column you
prefer most:

(1)
You get
“Other” gets

A
$480
$80

B
$540
$280

C
$480
$480

(2)
You get
“Other” gets

A
$560
$300

B
$500
$500

C
$500
$100

(3)
You get
“Other” gets

A
$520
$520

B
$520
$120

C
$580
$320
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(4)
You get
“Other” gets

A
$500
$100

B
$560
$300

C
$490
$490

(5)
You get
“Other” gets

A
$560
$300

B
$500
$500

C
$490
$90

(6)
You get
“Other” gets

A
$500
$500

B
$500
$100

C
$570
$300

(7)
You get
“Other” gets

A
$510
$510

B
$560
$300

C
$510
$110

(8)
You get
“Other” gets

A
$550
$300

B
$500
$100

C
$500
$500

(9)
You get
“Other” gets

A
$480
$100

B
$490
$490

C
$540
$300
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